

Review Article

Violence, Electoral Malpractice and Democratic Movement in Nigeria

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Abstract: The process of democratization in Nigeria is the subject of this paper's primary concern. In the course of the conversation, we will be reflecting on the twin evils of election malpractice and violence, which have been the obstacles that have been standing in the way of the establishment of democracy in the country. On the one hand, the process of democratization was shown to be a turning point in terms of the problems of accountability, transparency, and socioeconomic progress. In contrast, the process of democratization has been plagued by severe instances of electoral fraud and recurrent incidents of violence associated with elections in both military and civilian governments. The breadth and characteristics of the twin evils that are trending in democracy in Nigeria are investigated in this article. Additionally, recommendations are made on measures to limit Election Malpractice and other forms of political violence that are related to it.

Keywords: Violence, Electoral, Malpractice, Democratic, Movement

Introduction

In Nigeria, like in other parts of Africa, one of the goals of the democratic transition has been to establish a free and fair election system, which is the hallmark of liberal democracy. According to the International Institute of Democratic and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), liberal democracy is a procedural system based on open political competition, multi-party participation, civil and political rights guaranteed by law, and accountability through an electoral relationship between citizens and their representatives. However, Nigerian citizens have definitely been denied a full taste of liberal democracy under this definition.

Using qualitative data analysis, this article tries to characterize democratization in Nigeria. The goal is to identify the features of electoral fraud and violence and offer solutions for preventing, managing, and controlling these two in the country. Specifically,

the issue is: what dangers do malpractice and violence pose to democratic consolidation in the country? Is it possible to remedy malpractice and violence via democratic processes? If so, how? Will the democratization backlog be resolved, and will Nigeria develop? However, it is difficult to examine the trend of democratization in Nigeria without first defining what democracy and democratization imply and what they represent in the Nigerian context.

The Concept of Democracy and Its Expansion

Diamond (1992) and Potter et al. (1995) agreed that the notion of democracy has generated a large body of scholarship. However, it is vital to recognize that a thorough definition of democracy is both conceptually and theoretically impossible. Thus, attempts by researchers and political theorists of all ages, disciplines, and social backgrounds to define democracy have failed due to ambiguity and antinomy. According to Williams (1995:65), this fundamental epistemic deadlock might be attributed to the fact that the notion of democracy itself is a constant becoming. The democratic ideal remains only a concept, and a fully democratic society is a political and historical fantasy.

Despite compounding philosophical and ideological differences in defining democracy, scientists and researchers have used a variety of tactics and strategies to demonstrate its frequently conflicting reality. Diamond (1992) defined democracy as a system of government that meets three essential conditions: meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and groups (especially political parties) for all effective positions of government power, at regular intervals and excluding the use of force, and a high level of political participation in leader selection.

According to this definition, a nation is considered democratic if it combines the majority of the characteristics specified or highlighted in the definition. Specifically, freedom of speech, freedom of association, the supremacy of the electorate's will, regular elections, and accountability; a country is semi-democratic if it combines some of these features, and undemocratic if its policy lacks most or all of these features. Diamond (1992) briefly accounts for the significant democratic developments in regions and nations in the late 1980s and 1990s, with an emphasis on the developing world, in an attempt to represent and analyze the worldwide democratic movement in recent years. He also evaluates this development quantitatively, proposing both formal definitions of democracy and conceptual typologies that allow for more precise assessment. Diamond also analyzed the "leading causes of this most recent way of global democratic expansion" He closes by presenting the opportunities and conditions for democracy over the next decade.

Scholars such as Huntington (1993) and Philippe (1993) characterize democratization as a "major global phenomenon during the twentieth century," implying that it is not a new occurrence but rather a "historical process." According to Philippe et al. (1993), there are several varieties of democracy and their various practices, all of which have a distinct range of impacts. The precise shape that democracy takes is determined by a country's socioeconomic situation, as well as its established state institutions and policy practices. Nnoli (2000) defines democratization as a complicated social phenomenon

characterized by ambiguities, variances, uncertainty, and incompatibilities. It is the concretization of popular power, which frequently has both positive and harmful consequences, around which social forces coalesce and wage war."

According to Huntington (1993), democratization processes vary by area of the world. From 1974 to 1990, at least 30 nations transitioned to democracy, roughly tripling the number of democratic governments worldwide. He divides democratization into three waves: the first, second, and third, with the present democratic transition being the third wave (reintroduction). It is well beyond the scope of this contribution to define in detail the many elements that have contributed to the growth of democracy on the African continent or in a specific sub-region. Rather, I would want to give a frank evaluation and appraisal of the prospects, risks, challenges, accomplishments, and restrictions of Nigeria's democratization processes, which are frequently marred by rigging and violence.

According to Potter et al. (1997), "democratization refers to political changes moving in a democratic direction". They noted that democratization spread particularly rapidly in the 1970s. They explained why certain governments advance in the direction of democracy while others do not, as well as why some are more democratic. It is important to emphasize that democratization necessitates political independence from the state, including the right to speak, organize, and demonstrate. Democratization is therefore a process aimed at achieving democratic goals, and it has remained a prominent topic in Nigerian politics, as well as in other African countries. The effect of the battle for democratic objectives may be seen throughout the political history of the democratic transition. However, Matusik (cited in Burch, 1998) contends that the manifestations of this struggle have been condemned as the haunting menaces of a culturally homogenizing globalization that impoverishes billions of people and promises a politically sterile and weakened form of democracy that has increased social, political, economic, and cultural exploitation as a result of flaccid democratic arrangements and the culturally homogenizing effects of integrated global markets. In relation to the exploitation caused by flaccid democratic arrangements and the culturally homogenizing effects of integrated global markets, Nnoli (2000) assessed that while the earlier form of globalization, exemplified by colonialism, created by an undemocratic state structure, which Africans have waged a relentless struggle to democratize, the contemporary form abolishes the state as the focus of that struggle. It therefore renders democracy obsolete.

While the term "democratization" refers to "political changes moving in a democratic direction," it is used in this contribution to reflect on the restrictions of democratization processes, which are frequently weakened by election fraud and violence. Thus, democratization is a "process of struggle over democratic objectives and has remained a major issue in the world today". The democratization push in modern Nigeria strives to develop democratic principles that would improve the populace's participation in decision-making. As a result, democratization is dependent on the spread of societal ideals and structures that allow for greater participation in the exercise of governmental authority. The movement for empowerment is an important political trend in Nigeria's democratization. This suggests a greater emphasis on good governance and respect for

human rights. However, this trend raises major problems. In truth, Nigerians' views were honoured, if reluctantly. This is particularly evident in the disempowerment of the people as a result of electoral fraud and violence. Freedom of expression and the press are of little value to Nigerian voters, nor is the freedom to run for public office or vote, given their complete immersion in daily survival problems and the futility of exercising choice in ignorance. Electoral misconduct is perhaps the most significant obstacle to Nigeria's democratic process. Even access to equality before the law and due process is ineffective because they lack confidence and resources to seek justice in a legal system that is excessively expensive, frightening, and unfamiliar to their culture. Access will only be meaningful and relevant if it includes the elimination of these barriers.

Electoral Violence and Malpractice in Nigeria: Nature and Characteristics

The lack of financial empowerment and the restricted autonomy of multiple electoral authorities are two institutional elements that IDEA (2001) identifies as significant obstacles to the election process in Nigeria. Another concern is the insufficient human resource base. Some of the flaws in the electoral process include inaccurate voter registration and major issues with logistics and communication. The historical and current massive political corruption in Nigeria is a major psychocultural component that has weakened the economic and social foundations upon which a democratic political culture has been built and maintained. There is a significant institutionalized structural aspect against which these political considerations are situated against. Some of the more severe and obvious instances of election fraud are;

1. Vote rigging, ballot box overpopulation, ballot register overbloating, voter and election official favouritism, ballot box disappearance or destruction, etc.
2. Results that have been manipulated or skewed.
3. Declaration of an electoral fraud and its subsequent annulment

In spite of the gravity of the aforementioned electoral irregularities, the country's democratization efforts have been severely hampered by the "election forgery" in April 2003, the "falsification of election results" in 2007, and the "electoral flaws" in the presidential, gubernatorial, and assembly elections in 2011. The country's corporate survival has been jeopardized by these activities, which are a swat against democracy and the democratization process. A lack of discipline in the forms, spirit, and implementation of the election process is one of the other elements that is often mentioned as hindering competitive electoral politics in Nigeria.

1. The widespread practice of over-monetizing political campaigns.
2. A prevalent "winner takes all" mentality among the political elites;
3. The widespread prevalence of poverty and ignorance.
4. The parties' murky ideological foundations.
5. Religious and, to a lesser degree, ethnic bigotry
6. Party feuds and intraparty strife are common manifestations of political violence

Instances of violence at polling stations, in the aftermath of elections, and in political party headquarters stemming from candidates' distribution of campaign funds to supporters are all too common. The fact that violence has marred Nigeria's democratization process, elections, and transition is, in truth, old news at this point. The men of the underworld have taken up this stance as a way to achieve their goals in participating in politics, according to Njokuwu (2003), so violence is now considered a "spoil" of politics. That is to say, among other undesirable developments, electoral fraud and thuggery became commonplace, posing a threat to the democratic experiment. There was widespread vandalism of political opponents' property as well as intimidation and brutalization that led to deaths. Not only did many partisan politicians in Nigeria lose their lives as a result of ethnic animosities and suspicion, but the country's prime minister, premiers, ministers, and candidates were all victims of the political process's manipulation for partisan appropriation of office requirements.

Structural Theory of Conflict

The goal of this contribution is to use a liberal interpretation of structural theory of conflict to explain how election malpractice and violence have hampered Nigeria's efforts to democratize. Possibly, according to structural theory of conflict, society's primary sources of conflict stem from structural flaws that are either intrinsically or extrinsically conditioned. The idea that human societies are formed and organized in a way that gives rise to violence or conflict is fundamental to structural theory of conflict, as pointed out by Habu (2006:19). The theory posits that conflict emerges from a fundamental structural dysfunction by analyzing the impact of both internal and external factors on the structure and organization of societies. Many scholars have examined imperialism, colonialism, and Neo-colonialism through the lens of structural conflict. This includes radical political economists like Karl Marx, African revolutionaries like Kwameh Nkrumah, and underdevelopment and dependency theorists like Samir Amin and Nabudere. Their analyses have been applied to the experiences of most African states both before and after independence. According to Habu (2006:20), the liberal interpretation of structuralism places an emphasis on "how the competing interest groups tie conflict directly into the social, economic and political organisation of society as well as the nature and strength of social network within and between community groups." Like Galtung and other structuralists, he concluded that conflicts are more likely to arise in plural societies when economic and political discrimination, as well as a lack of tolerance, are deeply ingrained in human social relationships. The academics also reasoned that other causes of internal disputes include economic underdevelopment, demographic issues, and overpopulation, as well as politically and socially disinterested institutions.

We want to make a case that while there are certain factors, like the constitution, resource management, imperialism, etc., that put a lot of pressure on Nigeria to democratize, there is also an attitude factor that undermines democratic culture: physical violence against individuals or groups. It can be interpersonal, as in cases of violence against women, or it can be societal, affecting groups of people who share characteristics such as biology, history, or ideals. While physical force doesn't always cause conflict, it is a

common catalyst. Habu stresses that the idea covers a lot of ground, from showing excessive force and lying to employing physical force with the express aim of abusing or harming someone or a group. Violence, then, is defined as the use of deadly force against an individual, a group, or a nation with the intent to cause harm. To be more precise, Otite (1999, cited in Tapa, 2003:1) suggested that electoral violence may be defined as any type of violence that arises from any perspective, opinion, or practice during the course of an election. The use of force by political parties or their supporters to intimidate opponents or threats to a democratic system is known as electoral violence, he said. This has frequently been used to justify the use of undemocratic methods, including force, to seize political power. In some cases, people resorted to violence as a means of daring others to publicly declare their candidate selections; in other cases, it was a response to electoral fraud.

Election-Related Violence and Malpractice in Nigeria: A Comprehensive Analysis

The most clearly defined factors in the extent and characteristics of electoral malpractice and violence in Nigeria include cynicism, manipulation of election procedures (such as voter registration), rigging, thuggery, nullification, and blatant falsification of election results. It is important to remember that Nigeria has been democratising for a while now, but that non-democratic governments have organised and conducted a succession of transitions to civil rule prior to the Fourth Republic. The British regime orchestrated the first transition (1954–1960) that gave rise to the first republic (1960–1966) (Mackintosh, 1966; Post and Vickers, 1973 Post 1960), whereas military regimes executed the subsequent transitions that gave rise to the second, third, and now fourth republics (Kurfi, 1983; Oyediran, 1981; Ujo, 2000a and 2000b; cited in (Bako, 2001, p. 3). However, civilian democratic governments were in charge of organising and carrying out the elections in 2003, 2007, and 2011.

Looking at the pattern of events and problems surrounding political violence and electoral malpractices throughout Nigeria's political history will help us grasp the breadth and depth of the election crisis. In his analysis of electoral malpractices and political violence in Nigeria, Odama(2010;1) identified four distinct eras: the colonial era, the early years of independence (1960–1965), the era of military dictatorship, and the civilian regimes that existed between the era of military dictatorship and the current civilian fourth republic. Election fraud and violence in Nigeria, he noted, have their roots in the years preceding 1960. According to him, there was proof that the British colonial rulers rigged every election they presided over, beginning with the legislative council elections in Lagos and Calabar in 1922 and continuing all the way up to the 1958/59.

Consequently, any comprehensive analysis of the current trajectory towards democratization, electoral malpractice, and violence in Nigeria must, if only briefly, touch on the possible effect of spillover from colonialism on subsequent elections held in Nigeria following the end of the colonial era. When the 1964 General Election rolled along, the situation only got worse. At a meeting convened by the then-prime minister, all parties agreed to guarantee an impartial election. However, the agreements struck were subsequently violated. The agreements to ease the bans on public meetings were broken,

rallies in the North were denied rally licences, and their candidates and polling agents were arrested in large numbers in the North. The United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) requested that the elections be postponed due to the arbitrary arrests, detentions, and intimidation of its candidates. The government declined, and UPGA decided to boycott the elections. Copious evidence of these incidents was presented to the President.

Elections supposedly took place in parts of Nigeria where the governments were in charge, including the federal territory of Lagos and the northern and western regions, despite the boycott. The regions in the East and Midwest that were under the influence of the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) had the most impact from the boycott. Despite the NNDP's obvious unpopularity, as shown by the ridiculously low votes it earned even in the absence of opposition, it asserted triumph in the West due to the boycott. Following this injustice, the Western Region descended into one of the most violent civil uprisings against the government and its supporters that the nation had ever witnessed, culminating in the 1966 military coup. The elections held in December 1964 were a complete and utter sham, according to Ademoyega (1981:19). The Eastern Region abstained entirely because the NCNC government utilized its authority to prevent any kind of election from taking place there. The election results were uncredited and nationally unsatisfactory because of the partial boycott in the west, north, mid-west, and Lagos. The UPGA, on the one side, and the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) and its NNA supporters, on the other, accepted them; this led to a national impasse, as mentioned in Osinbajo (2008).

During the time of military rule, three elections were held: one in 1979, conducted by General Obasanjo's first coming; two in 1992 and 1993, by General Babangida; and one in 1999, by General Abdul Ali Abubakar. It was a highly contentious election in each of these races. The military quickly settled the so-called twelve-two-thirds conflict that arose from the 1979 elections. The military had already decided on the outcome of the 1992–1993 elections, so they repeatedly manipulated the process to get their way. Using the pretext that the military was uneasy with the results, the annulment of June 12, 1993, was both unlawful and blatant. While advocating for the maintenance of the military dictatorship, the Association for Better Nigerians, either accidentally or on purpose, filed a lawsuit challenging the election results and secured an injunction. The third effort to establish lasting democracy in Nigeria failed due to the escalation of inter-ethnic conflict and animosity caused by the annulment of the 1993 general election results. Electoral authorities were tightly controlled by military rulers in 1999, and the rules for the elections were defective. Additionally, there was no lawful and constitutional constitution in place. As a result, many believe the outcomes were predetermined.

After Shehu Shagari's National Party of Nigeria (NPN) government held general elections in 1983, Olusegun Obasanjo's administration held general elections in 2003 and 2007, and the late Yar'adua/Jonathan administration held general elections in 2011. All four sets of elections were held under civilian regimes beginning in 1983. The NPN government that was in power in 1983 committed numerous electoral crimes during the elections. All aspects of the voting procedure, including voter registration and the number of votes cast,

were significantly skewed. In order to achieve the aforementioned "landslide" and "bandwagon effect," the NPN government opted to hold the presidential elections first, despite the fact that the voters' rolls were skewed to show that they should have been held last. The "2003 general elections dismayed and scandalised the ruling party's open and brazen resort to manipulation and forgery of election," according to Onike (2009). There was blatant vote-buying, ballot-snatching at gunpoint, unlawful manipulation of the voter registration list, and rigging in the 2007 elections. There was a rape of the electoral process in the 2007 election, which was the result of a do-or-die affair that led to the elimination of the Nigerian electorate. Williams claims that the 2007 elections were the worst in American history and, by extension, in human history since liberal democracy began (The Nation, October 8, 2009, pages 41 and 42). No election in our nation's history has ever caused the people so much suffering as this one. Indeed, the head of the Election Observation Mission (EOM), the European Union (EU), made the observation that the 2007 general elections fell "far short of basic international and regional standards for democratic elections" in regard to their conduct. The 2007 elections "were marred by extremely poor organisation, lack of essential transparency, widespread procedural irregularities, substantial evidence of fraud, widespread voter disenfranchisement at different stages of the process, lack of equal conditions for political parties and candidates and numerous incidents of violence..." as stated by the EOM. (Original source: National Daily, June 2010).

The 1999, 2003, and 2007 election reports should be included in the survey of contested elections in Nigeria. These reports demonstrated a persistent pattern of political violence, which includes the assassination of candidates, voter intimidation, and harassment of politicians. The police and other security personnel were heavily criticised by both domestic and foreign observers for several reasons, including failing to ensure the safety of voters, violating their human rights, not following the law, and even directly participating in violent incidents, vote rigging, intimidation, and theft of ballot boxes. Despite being hailed by EOM as one of the most successful presidential elections in Nigeria's history, there have been reports of ballot box stuffing, underage voting, and outright results fraud in a few areas during the 2011 election. On Wednesday, April 20, 2011, the Leadership Newspaper featured an article about post-election violence. The article stated, "121 dead: Kaduna 50, Kano 30, Bauchi 16, Katsina 8, Gombe 17," and the number of displaced was 15, 000. Seventy corps members narrowly evaded death in Minna after election riots, as reported on page 2. Members of the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) were all parties involved. "Election Violence: IG Orders State Commissioners on Red-Alert" follows on the same page. Also, "FG Sends Reinforcement to Kaduna Amid Post-Election Crisis." (Omotayo, 2011, p. 1).

Several commonalities and trends emerge from this analysis of Nigerian elections held across colonial, civilian, and military regimes. To begin, they have been defined by a great deal of controversy, blatant disregard for the "sovereignty of the vote," and large-scale frauds, threats, and even murders of political opponents. Politicians and ruling administrations are self-serving; they have long encouraged and tolerated a climate of

electoral violence and warfare. The days leading up to, during, and after every election have always been fraught with controversy.

And secondly, although war and bloodshed have persisted, the governmental structures that have enabled them have changed over time. Therefore, new political formations have emerged with each epoch, mirroring the political class's tendency for *principlelessness* and flitting allegiances as well as the complete de-ideologization of the topics that originally split them. As an example, the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), Nigeria's Peoples Party (NPP), and Great Nigeria's People Party (GNPP) were the leading political groups in the field between 1979 and 1983, whereas the NPC, NCNC, and AG were the main parties from 1951 to 1966. Politicians were pushed into the NRC and the SDP from 1987 until 1993. The two herds transformed into the infamous "five leprous fingers" on one "leprous hand" during Abacha's disastrous attempt at self-sufficiency. There were additional transformations between 2003 and 2007, with the emergence of Action Congress for Democracy (ACD), Action Congress (AC), and others. From 1999 to 2003, the five "leprous fingers" transformed into three major political parties: the Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP), Alliance for Democracy (AD), and All Nigeria People Party (ANPP). The 2011 appearance of the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) and the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) is indicative of this shift away from ideology and towards rival camps.

It must be stressed that politicians, in collusion with the National Electoral Commission and other security forces, often perpetrate electoral malpractices. For their own self-interest, these accomplices frequently condoned the manipulation of election results. By using tactics such as multiple counting of votes and blatant fabrication of election results, election riggers alter the outcome of the vote by inducing voters to cast ballots, stuffing ballot boxes, and manipulating the results.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Maybe the most obvious and all-encompassing conclusion that can be derived from Nigeria's election trends and practices is that they have not helped foster the growth of a democratic society. Additionally, they have not been successful in promoting socioeconomic progress. Actually, they are to blame for the country's underdevelopment for two reasons: first, they produce social instability, and second, a government that uses corruption to gain power cannot inspire its citizens to support a visionary development programme. Given the prevalence of politically motivated violence and electoral malpractices in Nigeria, it is reasonable to assume that many Nigerians, including women, have shied away from getting their hands dirty with politics.

A free election is one in which all eligible voters are given a fair chance to cast their ballots. Members of the media, candidates, and political parties must all be able to freely assemble, associate, move, and speak their minds. No one should be able to intimidate others in a political setting. Achieving meaningful elections requires this kind of independence. A fair election is one in which all eligible voters have a fair chance to cast a ballot, the process is free from fraud, and all parties involved have enough time to prepare

for and deal with any issues that may arise during the election. A "level playing field" is also necessary for fairness; this means that no political party or candidate can use public funds for their own benefit, and that all candidates and parties have an equal opportunity to reach out to voters and gain their support, including fair access to the media. Everyone with a stake in Nigeria's politics is worried about the country's track record of holding elections that are free, fair, and acceptable. Over the years, the ruling class has consistently disregarded established norms and regulations. At the same time, we need to stop encouraging scepticism and a culture of political corruption and actively engage more people in the democratization process. Until corruption is dealt with, democratization in Nigeria will not be successful, according to political scientists (Tamuno, 2003; Kyari, 2003).

According to their well-reasoned opinion, the typical behaviour of a Nigerian politician seeking an unfair advantage during their campaign for public office is the source of political violence and other related issues, such as election fraud. Because corruption is ingrained in Nigerian culture, it exacerbates the country's crisis and undermines efforts to eradicate it. Institutionalized corruption has ruined numerous societies and institutions, so finding a solution will require concerted public awareness campaigns. Furthermore, reducing corruption requires simultaneous action against the pervasive poverty and the issue of the over-monetization of politics.

Building stronger political parties to act as a platform for political education and to regulate political violence ought to be a serious recommendation for reducing malpractice and violence associated to elections in Nigeria. Simply put, the ability of political parties to interpret the values and principles of popular democracy is crucial to the health of any democracy. It is necessary to reorganize or reform INEC so that organizations rooted in civil society, human rights, democracy, or the law can be represented there. This would prevent government appointees, who tend to follow the government's lead, from abusing their positions. To address the problem of reducing political violence in the nation, it is equally acceptable for civil society organizations to actively participate in election monitoring. It is not enough for civil society to merely observe elections and report back to headquarters; active participation in monitoring elections is also necessary to guarantee that all parties involved, including candidates, voters, and the Independent National Election Commission (INEC), respect and adhere to the electoral rules. If INEC is serious about addressing the issues of election malfeasance and violence, it may suggest including lessons on how to cast a ballot in secondary school curricula.

In addition, addressing and combating the threat of cynicism is laudable in its strategy for preventing electoral violence and malpractice in Nigeria. Due to past instances of election fraud, the general public now views the prospect of a free and fair election and, by implication, a functional democracy with scepticism. It has been a common belief among many Nigerians that influential people may have already decided the results of the elections, regardless of whether they cast a ballot or not. According to Kyari (2003:165), our top priority should be becoming aware of and prepared to combat different types of electoral malpractice. One way to do this is for primary groups to band together as election

vigilantes, pledging to cast their ballots freely and willingly for the candidates they support. Optimists in Nigeria are certain that the country's well-known electoral and related ailments may be cured, according to Tamuno (2003:41), who takes this stance. However, this can only happen if the majority of Nigerians, both leaders and followers, agree to play a pivotal role in efforts to permanently cure these diseases. Thus, seeking out scapegoats is not only a waste of time but will most likely make the suffering of the recognized sufferer worse. The absence of effective democratic leadership, however, is the root cause of Nigeria's democratic crisis. To rephrase, as long as democratic consolidation is an issue, effective governance cannot exist, as it would exacerbate the country's election malpractice and violence crises if it were not democratic and supported by strong institutions.

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