
Original Research Article

The Bakassi Settlement between Nigeria and Cameroon and the Practice of Preventive Diplomacy in Africa's Gulf of Guinea Sub Region, 2002 to 2025

Dr. Emeh Blessing^{1*}, Prof. Edna AdaGogo Brown²

¹ Department of History and International Studies, University of Africa, Toru-Orua, Bayelsa State, Nigeria.

² Federal University Otuke

Correspondence should be addressed to Dr. Emeh Blessing: blessing.emeh@uat.edu.ng

Article No: 035 | **Accepted:** 02 October 2026 | **Published:** 10 October 2026

Abstract: The settlement of the Bakassi dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon is often described as a model of peaceful boundary change in Africa. This article tests that description. It uses a qualitative case study design built on documentary analysis of the International Court of Justice judgment of 10 October 2002, the Green tree Agreement of 12 June 2006, United Nations records, the proceedings of an International Peace Institute conference, peer reviewed scholarship, Nigerian press reporting and testimonies already in the public record. It asks whether the settlement succeeded as law, as process and as protection for people. The analysis draws on three ideas: the African norm of boundary permanence, preventive diplomacy through the good offices of the United Nations Secretary General, and Johan Galtung's distinction between negative and positive peace read alongside human security. The article finds that the settlement achieved legal closure and interstate peace at remarkably low cost, largely because of executive leadership in Abuja and Yaoundé, quiet mediation by Kofi Annan and the face saving design of the Greentree Agreement. It also finds that procedural legitimacy was thin inside Nigeria, where the Agreement appears never to have been ratified, and that human security was weak, since large numbers of Bakassi people were displaced into camps and unfinished resettlement sites while those who stayed reported harassment and disputed levies. The article concludes that Bakassi is a model of how to end an interstate dispute without war, but not yet a model of how to settle the fate of the people who live on a boundary. Recommendations are offered to Nigeria, Cameroon, the African Union and the institutions of the Gulf of Guinea.

Keywords: Bakassi Peninsula; Greentree Agreement; Preventive Diplomacy; International Court of Justice; Boundary Disputes; Gulf of Guinea; Human Security; Nigeria; Cameroon.

1. Introduction

Few statements about African international relations are repeated as often as the claim that the continent's boundaries were drawn in European capitals without regard for the people who live along them. Fewer readers stop to notice the companion fact that Jeffrey Herbst (1989) placed at the centre of his analysis: those same lines have proved remarkably durable. Independent African governments, the Organization of African Unity and the wider international community all found it safer to preserve inherited frontiers than to reopen them, and the practice has held for six decades with only a handful of exceptions (Herbst, 1989; Seymour, 2013).

The dispute over the Bakassi Peninsula belongs to those exceptions, and it is exceptional in a second sense as well. A quarrel that might ordinarily have been settled by force, or simply left to fester, was referred by Cameroon to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1994, decided in Cameroon's favour on 10 October 2002, and then implemented through a chain of negotiated arrangements. Nigerian troops left most of the peninsula in August 2006, the remainder was transferred in August 2008, and a five year transitional regime closed in August 2013. Ngalim (2019) rightly calls the outcome the exception rather than the rule in African boundary politics. The United Nations Security Council praised both governments for resolving their differences responsibly and peacefully (United Nations Security Council, 2013), and Nigerian and Cameroonian officials, together with successive United Nations Secretaries General, have repeatedly offered Bakassi to the world as a model.

For readers in the Niger Delta and the wider Gulf of Guinea, the model claim is not an abstract one. Bakassi lies a short boat ride from Calabar. Its people were largely fishing families with cultural and commercial ties to the Efik and Ibibio communities of the Cross River estuary (Eze, 2008), and when the peninsula changed hands the consequences were felt in Cross River and Akwa Ibom States, in the National Assembly, in the naval and oil politics of the Gulf, and in camps and resettlement sites that were still occupied at the time of the most recent reporting available to this study (Akpan, 2022; Ngalim, 2019).

That is the problem this article addresses. The Bakassi model is usually judged by what happened between states. The ICJ ruled, the presidents met, the troops withdrew and the Security Council applauded. It is judged far less often by what happened to the people whom the boundary actually divided, or by whether the settlement won legitimacy inside Nigeria, where the Greentree Agreement, on the evidence of press reporting as late as 2022, had still not been ratified by the National Assembly (Akpan, 2022; Guardian Nigeria, 2019). A model that works for governments and fails for citizens is only a partial model, and it ought to be described as such before other African states are urged to copy it. The moment is apt. June 2026 marked twenty years since the signing at Greentree, which makes this a fitting time for a stocktaking.

Three research questions guide the analysis. First, how did legal, diplomatic and institutional mechanisms combine to end the dispute without war, and which of them carried the greater weight? Second, how far did the settlement achieve legitimacy and

durability, inside Nigeria and among the peoples of Bakassi? Third, what does the case teach about the governance of boundaries in Africa's Gulf of Guinea sub region? The article argues that Bakassi is a successful model of interstate conflict prevention and an unfinished model of human security, and that the gap between the two is the most useful lesson the case can offer to other African states.

The article proceeds as follows. The literature review maps existing scholarship, the theoretical framework sets out three tests for judging a settlement, and the methodology explains the sources and limits of the study. A historical section follows. Findings and discussion are then presented in eight subsections, after which recommendations and a conclusion close the article.

2. Literature Review

Scholarship on Bakassi can be grouped, without too much distortion, into three streams. The first celebrates the settlement as a model. The second explains why African boundaries persist and what the law says about title. The third looks at the people on the line. Each stream contains valuable work, yet they have rarely been read against one another.

2.1 The model stream

The model stream is the oldest and the most confident. Baye (2010), writing from the University of Yaoundé II, argues that peaceful settlement produced expenditure reducing effects, because resources tied to military postures could be redirected, as well as expenditure switching and wealth generating effects through expanded cross border activity. He concedes that the ICJ ruling, although grounded in sound historical evidence, met implementation difficulties. The conference reported by Issaka and Ngandu (2008) reached a comparable verdict from a policy standpoint. Participants drawn from both governments, the United Nations and the Commonwealth Secretariat singled out leadership, an impartial mediator, a monitoring mechanism, respect for the rule of law and patience with time as the ingredients of success. The same volume carries the accounts of Kamto (2008), then Cameroon's Minister Delegate for Justice, and Ogwu (2008), then Nigeria's Minister of Foreign Affairs, who present the process as an experiment in conflict prevention. Readers should remember that these are insider accounts, written by people who negotiated the settlement.

Abdulyakeen (2022), working from documentary records and semi structured elite interviews, adds a more analytical point. The ICJ ruling did not by itself address the need for urgent compliance, and it was the later arbitration style arrangements, guided by the law the Court had laid down, that turned a judgment into performance. This observation matters for what follows, because it locates the real work of the settlement in the period after the judgment rather than in the courtroom.

2.2 Boundaries and title

The second stream concerns why boundaries persist and on what basis title is decided. Herbst (1989) explains the paradox that African borders are widely called arbitrary

yet have scarcely moved since they were first demarcated in the late nineteenth century. He argues that the present system represents a rational response by colonial rulers and later African leaders to the demographic and ethnographic constraints of the continent. Seymour (2013) asks why Africa's borders have survived intact after independence and examines boundary maintenance in contemporary Africa through the interplay of sovereignty, territory and authority.

For Bakassi, this literature supplies the background against which the ICJ's reliance on colonial treaties must be read. The Court treated the Anglo-German Agreement of 11 March 1913 as the source of title and rejected Nigeria's plea of historical consolidation (International Court of Justice, 2002a, 2002b). Eze (2008), writing for the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, restated the Nigerian case, which rested on the older sovereignty of the Old Calabar city states, long administration from Nigeria and the ties of the peninsula's population. Whatever one thinks of the result, it confirmed the African norm that treaty title inherited from colonialism prevails over later possession.

2.3 The people on the line

The third stream turns from states to inhabitants. Ngalim (2019), a historian at the University of Buea, surveyed and interviewed resettled Bakassians in New Bakassi in January 2013. He found that practical economic needs and the wish for a meaningful voice in local governance, more than heritage values, drove the main grievances of the displaced, and that the resulting divide between indigenes and incomers in Akpabuyo could harden into conflict. Adenuga and Bamidele (2025), publishing in *World Affairs*, argue that a human security lens exposes the limits of sovereignty centred adjudication and calls for more inclusive, rights based mechanisms. Despite extensive documentation of displacement and statelessness, they note, limited scholarly attention has gone to the structural and legal conditions that keep the humanitarian crisis alive.

What the literature has not yet done is hold the model claim to the standard of the Agreement's own promises. The Greentree Agreement contains commitments to Bakassi's residents, in Article 3 and Annex I, as well as timetables for troops and administrators. Measuring the record against both sets of promises is the task of this article.

3. Theoretical Framework

Three bodies of thought are combined here.

The first is the African norm of boundary permanence. Herbst's (1989) account shows that inherited boundaries were held in place by institutional rules and elite interest rather than by any belief that they were just. The legal expression of the norm is the principle that new states inherit colonial frontiers, which the ICJ applied in the Bakassi judgment when it preferred treaty title to effective possession (International Court of Justice, 2002a). The norm explains why Nigeria's claims, however sincerely felt, had little prospect before a court, and why African governments generally prefer to settle disputes inside the inherited frame.

The second is preventive diplomacy through good offices. Under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter, the Secretary General may draw on his independence and impartiality to prevent disputes from arising, escalating or spreading (Issaka & Ngandu, 2008). In his keynote to the 2007 Bakassi conference, Gambari (2008) identified three kinds of leverage that mediators often undervalue: trust built with the parties, impartial technical expertise, and enabling resources that help a party carry out its side of a bargain. These supply the vocabulary for judging Kofi Annan's role and the work of the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission.

The third is Johan Galtung's (1969) distinction between negative peace, which is the absence of direct violence, and positive peace, which requires the removal of structural violence so that people can realize their potential. Human security thinking, as applied by Adenuga and Bamidele (2025) to displacement and statelessness in Bakassi, carries the same insight. Read together, these ideas warn that a settlement can end an interstate quarrel and still leave structural harm in place for the very people the quarrel was about.

From these lenses the article derives three tests. The first is legal closure: did the settlement fix title and complete the transfer under international law? The second is procedural legitimacy: was the process accepted as lawful and fair by the domestic constituencies and affected peoples who had to live with it? The third is human security: were the people of the boundary protected in their lives, livelihoods, property and identity? These tests are the author's own analytic device. They are offered to structure a qualitative judgment and not to generate a numerical score.

4. Research Methodology

The study follows a qualitative, single case design. Bakassi is treated as an information rich case precisely because it is so widely cited as a success, which makes it a demanding test of what success means. Analysis proceeds by tracing the process across phases, from colonial delimitation to the ICJ judgment, through the Mixed Commission and the Greentree Agreement, and on to the period after the transition. The evidence is then coded thematically against the three tests set out above.

Evidence comes from five kinds of source. Legal and diplomatic records include the ICJ judgment and press statements of 10 October 2002, the text of the Greentree Agreement and statements by the United Nations. Institutional accounts include the 2008 International Peace Institute report, with its addresses by Gambari, Ogwu, Kamto and Eze, and the record of the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission published by the United Nations Office for West Africa. Peer reviewed studies include Baye (2010), Abdulyakeen (2022), Ngali (2019) and Adenuga and Bamidele (2025). Press reporting comes from *The Guardian* (Nigeria), IRIN and Agence France Presse. Finally, testimonies of participants and stakeholders were taken from the public record, that is, from interviews and statements already published in these sources. They are labelled as such in the text, quoted only briefly and attributed to the persons and outlets that published them. No new interviews were conducted and no private person was approached.

Because the request for this study was to give oral sources proper weight, they are treated here as a distinct evidence base and not as decoration. Three kinds are used. The first is interview material gathered by other researchers, above all the January 2013 fieldwork of Ngalim (2019) in New Bakassi, Idabato and Akwa, which combined 250 administered questionnaires, of which 189 were returned completed, with twelve key informant interviews among civil society leaders, traditional rulers, officials and politicians, conducted through local research assistants and tape recorded. The second is interviews and statements given to journalists and published by IRIN, *The Guardian* and other outlets. The third is oral addresses delivered by negotiators and scholars at the 2007 International Peace Institute conference and later published. Each is a secondary record of speech, so questions of editing, translation and the speaker's interests are examined in Section 6.6. Speakers are named only where the source names them and where they spoke in a public or official capacity.

Three limitations should be stated plainly. First, the study relies on published material and has no original fieldwork, so the voices of Bakassi residents reach the reader through reporters and other researchers. Second, demographic and financial figures on Bakassi are contested, and where sources disagree the disagreement is reported rather than resolved. Third, accounts by negotiators are naturally self favouring and have been read alongside independent reporting. Where dates differ between sources, as with the end of the transitional regime in August 2013, both dates are given.

5. Historical Background

5.1 Colonial delimitation and competing titles

The story begins in 1884, when Britain concluded treaties of protection with the kings and chiefs of the coast between Old Calabar and Victoria. The Nigerian case, as Eze (2008) presents it, holds that these treaties left the city states of Old Calabar with historic title over their dependencies, among them the Bakassi Peninsula, and that this title passed to Nigeria at independence. An exchange of notes between Britain and Germany in April and May 1885 set the line of separation at the Rio del Rey, which placed Bakassi on the British side. The picture changed with the Anglo-German Agreement of 11 March 1913, which redrew the boundary so that it ran to the west of the peninsula. Cameroon has always read that agreement as fixing Bakassi in German territory, and therefore in Cameroon (Kamto, 2008). Nigeria argued that the treaty lapsed with the First World War and was never revived, and that Bakassi continued to be administered from Nigeria through the mandate and trusteeship periods and beyond the 1961 plebiscite that sent Southern Cameroons to Cameroon (Eze, 2008).

5.2 From incident to litigation

Independence in 1960 did not settle the matter. On 1 June 1975 the two heads of state, General Yakubu Gowon and President Ahmadou Ahidjo, signed the Maroua Declaration extending the maritime boundary, but it was never ratified by Nigeria's Supreme Military Council, and the successor government of General Murtala Muhammed

rejected it (Eze, 2008; Issaka & Ngandu, 2008). A naval skirmish at Rio del Rey followed in 1981, Nigerian forces took villages around Lake Chad in 1987, and on 21 December 1993 Nigerian forces crossed at the mouth of the Akwayafe and occupied Bakassi, according to the Cameroonian account (Kamto, 2008). Cameroon approached the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations without result, and on 29 March 1994 filed its application at the ICJ, extending it on 6 June 1994 to the entire land and maritime boundary. Fighting flared again in February 1996, the Court ordered protective measures on 15 March 1996, and a mediation led by President Gnassingbé Eyadéma of Togo, known as the Kara process, failed to hold (Kamto, 2008).

5.3 The judgment of 10 October 2002

Judgment came by thirteen votes to three (Case note, 2002). The Court held that the boundary in Bakassi was delimited by Articles XVIII to XX of the Anglo-German Agreement of 11 March 1913 and that sovereignty over the peninsula lay with Cameroon. It rejected Nigeria's theory of historical consolidation, fixed the land boundary from Lake Chad to the peninsula, and determined the maritime boundary. It asked Nigeria to withdraw its administration and its military and police forces expeditiously and without condition, and it asked each party to withdraw from territory falling under the sovereignty of the other (International Court of Justice, 2002a, 2002b). Table 1 summarises the chronology that follows.

Table 1: Chronology of the Bakassi dispute and its settlement

Date	Event
11 March 1913	Anglo-German Agreement redraws the boundary west of Bakassi; later treated by the ICJ as the source of title.
1 June 1975	Maroua Declaration signed by Gowon and Ahidjo; not ratified in Nigeria.
21 December 1993	Nigerian forces occupy Bakassi, on the Cameroonian account.
29 March 1994	Cameroon files its application at the ICJ; extended on 6 June 1994.
10 October 2002	ICJ judgment awards Bakassi to Cameroon by thirteen votes to three.
15 November 2002	Geneva summit hosted by Kofi Annan; Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission created.
December 2003	Withdrawal and transfer of authority in the Lake Chad area.
12 June 2006	Greentree Agreement signed by Biya and Obasanjo at Manhasset, New York.
14 August 2006	Nigerian forces withdraw from most of the peninsula; Cameroonian flag raised.
22 November 2007	Nigerian Senate resolution declares the withdrawal illegal.
12 December 2007	President Yar'Adua tells the Senate he is committed to the ICJ ruling and the Agreement.
14 August 2008	Final withdrawal and transfer of authority at a ceremony in Calabar.

Date	Event
10 October 2012	Ten year window for revision of the judgment closes without an application from Nigeria.
13 or 14 August 2013	Five year special transitional regime ends; Security Council welcomes the outcome on 15 August.

Sources: Eze (2008); Kamto (2008); Issaka & Ngandu (2008); Ngalim (2019); United Nations Security Council (2013); United Nations (2008); IRIN (2006a). The Security Council statement dates the close of the transitional regime to 13 August 2013, while the parties' joint statement and the Cameroonian presidency give 14 August (Presidency of the Republic of Cameroon, 2013; United Nations News, 2013b).

6. Findings and Discussion

6.1 Adjudication opened the door but did not walk through it

The initial finding is that the judgment, per se, established very little. The ruling was initially rejected by Nigeria as a colonial conspiracy (IRIN, 2006a) and the ruling by the Court did not have a schedule that could be imposed by the Court itself. Obedience was to be haggled, and was tiresome. According to the Cameroon version, the withdrawal of Bakassi was to be done in May 2004, but was postponed at the request of Nigeria to 15 September 2004 and then suspended by Nigeria on 2 August 2004, just three days after the official visit of President Obasanjo to Yaounde (Kamto, 2008). In June 2005 Cameroon government complained to the Security Council about the events involving the Nigerian soldiers where one of the Cameroonian soldiers was killed and it claimed that Nigeria was dragging its feet over a promise it had made (IRIN, 2005). They are Cameroonian utterances, and must be construed as such, but the fact of latitude is not disputed between the parties.

It was made very clear when Gambari (2008) pointed out that a court decision by the ICJ would not have been enough in itself to curb the tensions that the dispute had caused. Abdulyakeen (2022) comes to the same conclusion based on documentary evidence. It is the pivotal point in African experience. Title can be proclaimed by the courts, but between the proclamation and the performance settlements are gained or lost, and the Bakassi case suggests that it needs a second institution established to that purpose.

6.2 The Mixed Commission and Good offices as the engine at work.

The second was the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission and its origins were in silent diplomacy. On 5 September 2002, a few weeks prior to the decision, Kofi Annan convened Presidents Biya and Obasanjo in France where they agreed to respect and enforce the impending decision (Gambari, 2008; Kamto, 2008). After the judgment he called them again in Geneva on 15 November 2002 and they asked him to constitute a mixed commission of the two countries and the UN. It was chaired by his Special Representative to West Africa, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah and it conducted its activities through subsidiary bodies on demarcation, on affected populations, on withdrawals and transfers of authority and on the maritime boundary (Eze, 2008).

The results were concrete. Authority was transferred in the Lake Chad area in December 2003, along the land boundary in 2004 and in Bakassi in 2006 and 2008 (Eze, 2008; Issaka & Ngandu, 2008). Both sides agreed on the maritime charts and an independent study by the European Union indicated that the demarcation process was cost-effective (United Nations Office of West Africa, n.d.). Part of the burden was on the parties. Among the twelve million dollars to be paid as demarcation, Cameroon and Nigeria first contributed three million dollars each to the United Nations trust fund with the remaining being donated by the donors (Eze, 2008). This fact is analytically important, since it demonstrates that the disputants are the owners and not patrons of outsiders.

The triad of leverage suggested by Gambari is a close fit to the record. Annan had established a level of trust in both presidents and he was a West African so he had the advantage of credibility that other international leaders may not have had (Issaka and Ngandu, 2008). The Mixed Commission offered technical advice which was impartial in cartography and demarcation. The facilitating resources were the trust fund and the pledges of the donors. The Security Council on its part did not want to engage itself formally and urged the Secretary General to continue with his good offices (Gambari, 2008). On the day the Green tree Agreement was signed, Annan said that it crowned a remarkable experiment in conflict prevention (United Nations, 2006). Joy Ogwu, the Foreign Minister of Nigeria did not come out as an exception when she informed the 2007 conference that there was no sacrifice too big to restore peace between the two countries (Ogwu, 2008).

6.3 Greentree design and face saving logic.

The decision was put in a schedule in the Greentree Agreement of 12 June 2006 that both presidents were allowed to defend at home. Article 2, Nigeria would withdraw all its military forces in Bakassi within sixty days, which the Secretary General could not exceed ninety days. Annex I allowed Nigeria to maintain its civil administration and police in a defined zone in a non renewable period of two years after the withdrawal, after which Cameroon would apply a special transitional regime, which was also non renewable, of five years. Article 3 required Cameroon to expel or deprive neither Nigerian nationals nor to change their nationality, to respect their culture, language and beliefs, their farming and fishing, their property and customary land rights and to avoid discriminatory taxes and dues. A Follow-up Committee consisting of Cameroon, Nigeria, the United Nations and four witness states i.e. France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States was to monitor the implementation (Cameroon & Nigeria, 2006; United Nations, 2006).

The phased structure, which was read at the 2007 conference, was a face saver to Nigeria, a formula based on a nineteenth century agreement between Ecuador and Peru (Issaka & Ngandu, 2008). It enabled Abuja to term the process as negotiated and gradual rather than a surrender, and provided Cameroon with a definite deadline. It was an ingenious plan. Table 2 correlates its main commitments with what the sources report of their performance.

Table 2: Greentree commitments and the documented record

Commitment	Documented record	Assessment
Nigerian withdrawal of armed forces within 60 to 90 days (Article 2)	Troops left most of the peninsula on 14 August 2006, roughly two months after signature (IRIN, 2006a; Eze, 2008).	Fulfilled on time.
Nigerian civil administration and police for two years (Annex I)	Final transfer ceremony held in Calabar on 14 August 2008 (United Nations, 2008).	Fulfilled on time.
Five year special transitional regime under Cameroon (Annex I)	Ended in mid August 2013; welcomed by the Security Council (United Nations Security Council, 2013).	Fulfilled procedurally.
Protection of rights of Nigerians who remain (Article 3)	Reports of harassment, disputed levies and violent incidents (IRIN, 2006b; Ngalim, 2019; Guardian Nigeria, 2019).	Contested and unverified independently.
Follow-up Committee monitoring	Completed its work with the process; the Office for West Africa was folded into a wider office in 2016 (United Nations Office for West Africa, n.d.).	Ended; no successor for Article 3 found in the sources.
Domestic legal force in Nigeria (Constitution, Section 12)	Press reports say the Agreement was never ratified by the National Assembly (Guardian Nigeria, 2019; Akpan, 2022).	Unresolved.

Note: Assessments are the author's qualitative judgments from the cited sources.

6.4 Executive leadership, legislative resistance and the unratified treaty

Executives settled this dispute. Presidents Obasanjo and Biya, and after 2007, President Yar'Adua, all saw the ICJ case and ruling as matters of foreign policy. Nigeria's then-Permanent Representative to the UN, Professor I. Y. Ogwu, stated that the judgement and resulting withdrawal from Bakassi, reflected Nigeria's "tradition of amicable relations with neighboring countries" (Ogwu, 2008). The Parliament or National Assembly of Nigeria (the 'Legislature') took a different position. On 22nd November, 2007, the Nigerian Senate unanimously adopted a resolution, stating that the withdrawal from Bakassi Peninsula by Nigeria, was unconstitutional and illegal. It required the personal intervention of President Yar'Adua to convince the Senate to take any further steps regarding the ICJ case and Judgment. The State had a right to appeal the ICJ case, and Judgment (Ngalim, 2019). In 2012, the Nigerian State again refused to take an appeal from the ICJ case (Ramji, 2014).

Since 2008, the Green Tree Agreement has not been ratified (Ramji, 2014). The agreement has not entered into force. The 2019 investigation by The Guardian stated that the Agreement had not been implemented nor ratified, and that the state of affairs was in

violation of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Guardian Nigeria, 2019). The Chief Press Secretary to the Governor of Cross River state stated that the Green Tree Agreement had been “... more in breach than in observance” (Guardian Nigeria, 2019). The State of Cross River is seeking three trillion naira from the Federal Government of Nigeria for breaching the Agreement (Guardian Nigeria, 2019). Ratification of the Agreement would also not be in the best interest of the State, according to the Chairman of the Cross River State Caucus at the National Assembly, Senator Gershom Bassey, in 2022 (The Guardian Nigeria, 2022).


Table 3: Contested estimates of Bakassi’s population

Source	Estimate	Basis or context
Eze (2008)	About 37,500	Projection by the National Population Commission from the 1991 census.
Agence France-Presse (2013)	About 40,000	Reported figure at the close of the transitional regime.
Dos Santos (2014)	About 100,000	Reported number of Nigerians displaced from the peninsula, not the total population.
IRIN (2006c)	150,000 to 300,000	Estimate claimed by the leader of the Bakassi Self Determination Movement.
Ngalim (2019)	About 300,000	Approximate inhabitants, most of whom he reports as relocating to New Bakassi.

Note: The estimates are not directly comparable because they measure different things and rest on different methods.

Displaced people were resettled to camps and schools in Cross River state, including Ikang and Akpabuyo. Bakassi Local Government Area was created from the wards of Akpabuyo in 2007 with Local Government Law 7, but the supreme Court set aside the law. Because of this, the Electoral Commission has not established the new wards. Without representation, returnees continue to increase at the camps (Akpan, 2022). Conditions at the camps have been documented in Ngalim (2019) Returnees were housed in school class rooms, and the 5,000 naira stipend stopped in 2012. The houses built for returnees were given to other returnees or squatted by the host community. Most returnees can not practice fishing because they were relocated to an area that is far from the coast.(Ngalim, 2019) surveyed 76 returnees and compared the survey to the minimum standards of resettlement established by the United Nations. The majority of the respondents were negatively affected in all aspects of resettlement. More than 95% of the respondents were landless and food insecure. No respondents were affected positively. The effects of resettlement negatively impacted returnees' access to education and other social services. Ngalim (2019) recommends that because the study was exploratory, and participants were selected using purposive and snowball methods, the results can not be generalized and figures should be interpreted with caution.

Figure 1: Share of resettled respondents in New Bakassi reporting a negative effect, by indicator (n = 76)



Source: Constructed by the author from Table 5 in Ngalim (2019, p. 116), based on his January 2013 survey. The item labelled “Access to Landless” in the source is rendered here as landlessness. Percentages are of 76 respondents.

The testimonies in the public record give these numbers a human face. When the first transfer took place in August 2006, a university student and resident of Bakassi told the IRIN news service that it was “a gross violation of our human rights” for the United Nations to award the land to Cameroon without seeking the opinion of those who lived on it (IRIN, 2006a).

Public record testimony. Victor Ekang, resident of Bakassi, to IRIN at the transfer of August 2006: the decision was “a gross violation of our human rights” because the people were not asked (IRIN, 2006a).

Six years later the difficulty had deepened rather than eased. The representative of the Bakassi, Calabar South and Akpabuyo Federal Constituency in the National Assembly, Essien Ayi, summed up the Agreement as offering the people three hard choices: remain and become Cameroonians, stay as Nigerians who live like immigrants, or leave ancestral homes and become permanent refugees in their own country (as cited in Ngalim, 2019). Returnees interviewed in the resettlement sites described themselves as “political orphans” (Ngalim, 2019, p. 113). In 2022 one of them, Edet Ene Okon, told *The Guardian* that the displaced were surviving on menial jobs of about five hundred naira a day, had no money to buy fishing nets, and had become a community of “each man for himself and God for us all” (Akpan, 2022).

Public record testimony. Edet Ene Okon, Bakassi returnee, to *The Guardian*, 2022: after the vandalising of the resettlement estate, the displaced had scattered, lived on menial jobs and were “each man for himself and God for us all” (Akpan, 2022).

While some traditionally have been supporters of the state government, many spoke of the loss and longing of the past. Bakassi’s Joe-Mary Ekeng described an amicable, riverine community. The Former Chairman of Bakassi Local Government, Ani Esin,

described the situation as going well beyond the Greentree Agreement, and stated the need for the two governments and the people to meet and discuss (Akpan, 2022). In their discussion, Galtung alludes to situations where there exists structural violence. It could be employment, or the absence of it, and/or the relocation of people from their areas and the failure of the state to provide for them. The state apparently has failed in her duty to provide ‘Protection’ for these people. It has failed to create ‘Positive Peace’ for them. It is important to note that there exists a clear financial loss to the state and the people of Cross River for the ceding of Bakassi. From 2000 to 2010, it is reported that the state received a total of Thirty-Eight Billion Naira as compensatory allocation for Bakassi. State officials are reported to have described the allocation as insignificant (Akpan, 2022; Guardian Nigeria, 2019). It is evident that there has not been a final and definitive settlement to the compensation case by the parties involved spoke and the publication that preserved the words. Reading them together, rather than one at a time, yields four findings that the documentary record alone would not reveal.

Table 5: Principal oral sources from the public record

Speaker and role	Setting and date	Published in	Main point
Victor Ekang, student and resident of Bakassi	Interview at the transfer, August 2006	IRIN (2006a)	Residents were not asked before the land was awarded.
Leader of the Bakassi Self Determination Movement	Independence ceremony at Ekpote Abia, August 2006	IRIN (2006c)	Claimed to speak for the whole population; attendance was small.
Essien Ayi, member for the Bakassi, Calabar South and Akpabuyo Federal Constituency	Statement reported in 2012	As cited in Ngalim (2019)	The Agreement left three unattractive choices.
Twelve key informants and returnees at Ekpote Ikang, Idabato and Akwa	Fieldwork, January 2013	Ngalim (2019)	Stipend stopped; houses reallocated; fishing lost.
Ekpeyong Esong, former fisherman	Interview with VOA, 2012	As cited in Ngalim (2019)	Life in the resettlement site left no work at sea.
Christian Ita, Chief Press Secretary to the Cross River governor	Interview with The Guardian, 2019	Guardian Nigeria (2019)	Agreement breached; large compensation claim under study.
Edet Ene Okon, returnee; Joe-Mary Ekeng; Ani Esin; Emmanuel Etene; Nya Asuquo; Victor Effiom Ekpo; Gershom Bassey	Interviews for a feature, 2022	Akpan (2022)	Loss, nostalgia, disenfranchisement and rival remedies.

Speaker and role	Setting and date	Published in	Main point
Ogwu, Gambari, Kamto and Eze	Addresses at the International Peace Institute conference, July 2007	Issaka & Ngandu (2008)	Official and expert accounts of a model settlement.
Kofi Annan; Kieran Prendergast for the Secretary General	Greentree signing, June 2006; Calabar ceremony, August 2008	United Nations (2006, 2008)	Conflict prevention success; model for other disputes.

Note: Only speakers named in the cited publications are listed. All are quoted or paraphrased from the published record, and none was interviewed by the author.

Firstly, the number of speech registers is two and they barely overlap. Theorists and preachers, negotiators, talk of law, prevention, cost and credibility of institutions. The consent, the sea, food, wages and the vote are discussed by residents and returnees. The speeches in the book of International Peace Institute are those of ministers, a United Nations official and scholars and none of them of a Bakassi resident (Issaka & Ngandu, 2008). The oral record is a copy of the form of the settlement itself, in which the speakers were first heard, and the movers afterwards, the reporters, as a rule.

Second is the usual charge of consent. Ekanang complains in 2006, as well as the follow-up summary of the options by Ayi, are founded on the fact that the decision was taken on behalf of the inhabitants (IRIN, 2006a; as cited in Ngalim, 2019). The transfer did not occur after a consultation and in the sources there is no mention of a referendum or formal hearing of Bakassi opinion.

Public record testimony. In 2012, a former fisherman Ekpeyong Esong told the Voice of America that he no longer fished because there was no such activity at the resettlement location (Olukaya, 2012, as cited in Ngalim, 2019).

Third, the displaced have a greater survival than emotional concern in their stories. The Esong the returnee who was unable to buy nets, and the daily wage of approximately five hundred naira that Okon tells about all talk about a loss of occupation and not a loss of heritage (Akpan, 2022; as cited in Ngalim, 2019). Ngalim (2019) reaches the same conclusion in the analysis of his own interviews and it proves the assumption, which is often used in commentary, that the primary cause of suffering among the returnees was cultural.

Public record testimony. According to the Guardian, Emmanuel Etene, a former chairman of Bakassi Local Council, said that the returnees did not have their own constituency and asked the National Assembly to ratify the treaty or develop a new template, which was not applicable to the people on the ground (Akpan, 2022).

Fourth, Bakassi opinion is plural and this renders it hard to pledge to consult it. In the same 2022 feature, Etene wanted a law or ratification, Senator Bassey wanted ratification and special economic zone, Ekpo wanted a referendum, Esin wanted dialogue among the people themselves, and Asuquo wanted leaders, including some Bakassi leaders,

to put money above the people (Akpan, 2022). The Bakassi Self Determination Movement had claimed to represent the whole population in 2006 and the fact is that no single organization can represent the entire population (IRIN, 2006c). Consultation would then be a formal process, and would involve fishers, women, traditional rulers and youth, but not a spokesman.

There is a need of a word of reliability. Oral records that journalists maintained are edited and chosen and multiple speakers had an interest in the issue. Two of the speakers in the 2022 feature are also candidates who were in an elective office at the time state officials were seeking a compensation claim (Akpan, 2022). Ngalim (2019) himself documents that respondents were ill and fed up with being surveyed to death, some would have been happy to be paid to participate and that the authorities attempted to filter his questionnaires and warns against generalizing his sample. These things do not invalidate the testimony, but they purport to read it in convergence. A statement that is repeated in different independent voices, like the loss of fishing livelihoods is weighty. Where it is alone, as the number of persons reported to have been killed in the incident of the levy in 2017, it is here reported as an allegation.

6.7 Insecurity following the handover: non state actors and Article 3.

Not everyone was happy with the result. The first transfer had been preceded by a self-proclaimed Bakassi Self Determination Movement which had declared a republic at Ekpot Abia and had hoisted its own flag a few days earlier but the turn-up of just a few hundred people undermined the capacity of its leader to represent the whole population (IRIN, 2006c). The members of the conference in 2007 listed hostility towards Cameroon among the residents, harassment by Cameroonian gendarmes, difficulties in the identification process and delays in the promised schools, hospital and roads as threats to the process (Issaka & Ngandu, 2008). They also cautioned of a spillover of militancy in the Niger Delta and on 12 November 2007 twenty one Cameroonian soldiers were killed in a raid, a number quoted as twenty in some press reports (Issaka & Ngandu, 2008).

Subsequent incidences were associated with post transition period. According to Ngalim (2019), the Bakassi Freedom Fighters was engaging in militant activity at Day spring, and in March 2013, attacks at Efut Obot Ikot triggered by an argument over fishing rights and tax payments, resulted in the deaths of five people, 17 missing and approximately 1,700 displaced. The Agreement was presented to the ratification by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in July 2017, after the National Assembly, in reaction to an alleged attack where ninety seven Nigerians were allegedly killed because they refused to pay a boat levy of one hundred thousand naira, voted to investigate the matter (Guardian Nigeria, 2019). This is what the press and legislators have claimed and this study has not been able to substantiate this. They are however in line with the previous warnings that were made in 2007 and they directly relate to Article 3(2)(e) that prohibits discriminatory taxes on Nigerians in the zone.

The structural argument is that the human security provision of the treaty passed its watchdog. Their work was conducted by the Follow-up Committee and the Mixed

Commission (and subsequently the United Nations Office for West Africa) between 2002 and 2013 and then the United Nations Office for West Africa was combined into a bigger regional office (United Nations Office for West Africa, n.d.). In the sources used in this research, there is no successor body that seems to have a particular mandate to monitor Article 3 beyond 2013. An invitation to the kind of conflicts above mentioned is an unsecured guarantee.

6.8 Reading the model of the three tests.

Together, this evidence indicates a differentiated verdict, which Table 4 shows. The legal closure is a good record. Title was proved, transfer was made, the maritime charts were negotiated, the revision window was closed without an application and the Security Council of the United Nations sealed it with its seal (Ngalim, 2019; United Nations Security Council, 2013). It has not yet been tied up with loose ends such as the demarcation pillars that are yet to be installed in 2013 and the hydrocarbon deposits that could be on either side of the boundary that the Court did not decisively apportion (Eze, 2008; United Nations News, 2013a).

Table 4: The Bakassi settlement assessed against three tests

Test	Principal evidence	Assessment
Legal closure	Judgment of 2002; transfers of 2006 and 2008; maritime charts agreed; revision window closed in 2012; Security Council statement in 2013.	Largely achieved.
Procedural legitimacy	High between the two governments and the United Nations; low within Nigeria, where the Senate resisted and the Agreement appears unratified; affected inhabitants were not consulted before the transfer.	Partly achieved.
Human security	Displacement, unfinished resettlement, loss of livelihood, disenfranchisement, reported harassment and levies; no dedicated monitor for Article 3 after 2013.	Not yet achieved.

Note: Assessments are the author's qualitative judgments from the sources cited in Sections 6.1 to 6.7.

The success is put into perspective as it is compared to other African boundary conflicts. The war between Eritrea and Ethiopia over Badme as Iyob (2008) observes, escalated into a war that had claimed lives of over one hundred thousand people as compared to the Cameroon and Nigeria war that had claimed lives of about two hundred before it was contained. That is an actual opposition and balances to the above-described preventive diplomacy. The case is a prototype of peaceful resolution of fragile conflicts (United Nations, 2008), and a prototype of restraint between the states, the message of the United Nations Secretary General to the transfer ceremony of 2008 is well deserved of the accolade.

There are two qualifications that are based on the theoretical framework. Firstly, Bakassi does not doubt the rationality of permanence of boundaries as Herbst does. It confirms it. The claim to possession was that which had been transferred, and the frame which was used was the colonial frame, and the settlement claimed the inherited line, not the reclaimed line. Such is not the case with other states that are looking forward to revising a hereditary frontier by the Bakassi route. Second, the conference report observes that the African Union and the regional economic communities, ECOWAS and ECCAS did not have a vital role to play and this reduced the importance of the sub regional contribution (Issaka & Ngandu, 2008). It was a success to world institutions and two governments and little a success of African regional machineries. The consequences of such a gap are the distance that the model will be capable of traveling since the Gulf of Guinea has other unresolved maritime and boundary problems and institutions that are not as strong as the Mixed Commission.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

The results result in the following recommendations that are made to the actors who are best placed to act. They are recommendations to be taken into account and all of them should be counterbalanced with the opposing arguments stated in the text.

1. The National Assembly of Nigeria should either accede to the Greentree Agreement by expressly protecting it by law or by enacting a domestic law that would enforce the commitments of Nigeria, and should accompany that with a system of legal compensation and resettlement. The objection of Senator Bassey, that the ratification would put an end to claims, is an objection which must be answered in the body of the enabling law, and not in the silence which has hitherto been the rule.
2. A certified list of the affected by the transfer should also be established by the Federal Government and the National Population Commission with the cooperation of Cross River and Akwa Ibom States and the United Nations partners since no planning can be done when the estimates of the affected are in tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands.
3. Federal Government and Cross River State should view resettlement as a livelihood problem, as opposed to a housing problem. The Ngalim (2019) respondents insisted on being resettled and access to the sea, and the press was informed by the returnees themselves that they could not even afford fishing nets. A feasibility study of a riverine or coastal site, with fisheries inputs, is the practical response.
4. The Cross River State government and the Independent National Electoral Commission shall decide on the electoral status of the resettlement wards based on the perception of the Commission that the creation of wards is vested in the state electoral commission under the constitution, such that the returnees are not disenfranchised by a jurisdictional dispute (Akpan, 2022).
5. Cameroon will deliver a list of the taxes and levies to be paid by the nationals of Nigeria in Bakassi which will be in compliance with Article 3(2)(e) and will be visited by independent persons on a regular basis to the peninsula.

6. Cameroon, Nigeria and a neutral third party A light tripartite mechanism where the United Nations or the African Union is the neutral third party should oversee Article 3 to receive complaints, Ngalim (2019) proposes that the Mixed Commission be kept as an ad hoc institution to resolve the unsolved issues on the boundary.
7. In future settlements of boundaries like joint management of transboundary resources and the involvement of sub regional bodies that were largely absent in Bakassi, the African Union and the Gulf of Guinea Commission should come up with a regional dimension (Issaka & Ngandu, 2008).
8. Consultation with the affected populations, a funded human security provision and a named monitor should be considered as a normal aspect of any implementation plan of future courts and mediators. It is so inclusive, rights based in design that Adenuga and Bamidele (2025) support and the evidence is given in the Bakassi record.
9. Universities and research institutes in Nigeria are urged to gather and store oral histories of the peninsula and of the resettlement, with due consent, to enable future studies to be based on more than press reports.

8. CONCLUSION

On the one hand, the Bakassi settlement is worth its reputation and on the other, requires a reevaluation. It is a wonderful illustration of two neighbouring states, one of which is the giant of West Africa, acquiescing in an unfavourable decision and executing it by a long-suffering diplomacy, the United Nations furnishing good offices, technical assistance and a trust fund instead of troops. The cost in human life and money was small in relation to the options and the success was paid by the Security Council in 2013. It was mostly shut down by legislation.

But a settlement is not identified by the boundaries it establishes, but also by the lives it leaves. According to the evidence discussed in this paper, procedural legitimacy in Nigeria was just a sham and human security of the Bakassi people is an incomplete business 20 years since Greentree. Peace was achieved in a negative manner. The fishing families, who have been denied a home, waters and a voice in the decision, are yet to experience positive peace, as Galtung understands it.

The Gulf of Guinea sub region of Africa is thus taught a moral of the story in two ways. The crux of the case to the states which have inherited boundary wrangles might lie in the fact that war can be avoided by adjudication and a long-suffering and well endowed diplomacy. They must also be careful of the fact that a treaty that safeguards governments and not individuals hoards misfortune in the next few years. The following Bakassi, which is to be resolved, must be resolved with the people in the room and the human security clause must be financed on the first day.

References

1. Abdulyakeen, A. (2022). The role of international law in the resolution of boundary disputes in Africa: A case study of Bakassi Peninsula. *Jurnal Penegakan Hukum dan Keadilan*, 3(2), 128–151. <https://doi.org/10.18196/jphk.v3i2.14267>
2. Adenuga, G., & Bamidele, S. (2025). Disputed sovereignty and forced displacement: Rethinking the Bakassi Peninsula crisis through international law and human security. *World Affairs*, 188, Article e270036. <https://doi.org/10.1002/waf2.70036>
3. Agence France-Presse. (2013, August 14). Cameroon takes control in disputed Bakassi. Fox News. <https://www.foxnews.com/world/cameroon-takes-control-in-disputed-bakassi.amp>
4. Akpan, A. (2022, May 1). Bakassi returnees' two-decade grueling sojourn in 'new Bakassi'. *The Guardian (Nigeria)*. <https://guardian.ng/sunday-magazine/bakassi-returnees-two-decade-grueling-sojourn-in-new-bakassi/>
5. Baye, F. M. (2010). Implications of the Bakassi conflict resolution for Cameroon. *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, 10(1), 9–34. <https://doi.org/10.4314/ajcr.v10i1.59305>
6. Cameroon & Nigeria. (2006). Agreement between the Republic of Cameroon and the Federal Republic of Nigeria concerning the Bakassi Peninsula (Greentree Agreement). Signed at Greentree, New York, 12 June 2006. https://www.peaceagreements.org/media/documents/ag240_579f889c3abd3.pdf
7. Case note. (2002). Land and maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria; Equatorial Guinea intervening). International Institute for Law and Justice. <https://iilj.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Case-Note-on-Land-and-Maritime-Boundary-Between-Cameroon-and-Nigeria-ICJ-2002.pdf>
8. Dos Santos, G. P. (2014, October). The Bakassi Peninsula: A discreet problem with major implications. IPRIS Viewpoints. Portuguese Institute of International Relations and Security.
9. Eze, O. C. (2008). Nigeria and Cameroon before the International Court of Justice. In M. Issaka & K. Y. Ngandu (Rapporteurs), *Pacific settlement of border disputes: Lessons from the Bakassi affair and the Greentree Agreement* (pp. 20–27). International Peace Institute. <https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/bakassipub.pdf>
10. Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, peace, and peace research. *Journal of Peace Research*, 6(3), 167–191.
11. Gambari, I. A. (2008). Keynote address: Lessons from the resolution of the Bakassi dispute. In M. Issaka & K. Y. Ngandu (Rapporteurs), *Pacific settlement of border disputes: Lessons from the Bakassi affair and the Greentree Agreement* (pp. 7–10). International Peace Institute. <https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/bakassipub.pdf>
12. Guardian Nigeria. (2019, October 20). Ceding of Bakassi: 13 years on, Greentree agreement unratified, unimplemented. *The Guardian (Nigeria)*. <https://guardian.ng/news/ceding-of-bakassi-13-years-on-greentree-agreement-unratified-unimplemented/>
13. Herbst, J. (1989). The creation and maintenance of national boundaries in Africa. *International Organization*, 43(4), 673–692. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300034482>
14. International Court of Justice. (2002a). Land and maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening), Judgment (ICJ Reports 2002, p. 303). <https://www.icj-cij.org/node/103194>
15. International Court of Justice. (2002b, October 10). Statement to the press by President Guillaume. <https://icj-web.lemman.un-icc.cloud/sites/default/files/press-releases/9/2989.pdf>
16. IRIN. (2005, June 23). Cameroon: Government complains to UN about border incidents with Nigeria. *UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs*. <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2005/06/mil-050623-irin02.htm>
17. IRIN. (2006a, August 14). Cameroon flag hoisted over Bakassi as Nigerian troops pull out. *The New Humanitarian*. <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/node/227316>
18. IRIN. (2006b, September 27). Nigeria: Rehabilitation, harassment concerns mar Bakassi pullout. *The New Humanitarian*. <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/node/228029>
19. IRIN. (2006c). Bakassi inhabitants opt for independence ahead of Nigerian pullout. *The New Humanitarian*. <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/node/227170>

20. Issaka, M., & Ngandu, K. Y. (Rapporteurs). (2008). *Pacific settlement of border disputes: Lessons from the Bakassi affair and the Greentree Agreement*. International Peace Institute.
<https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/bakassipub.pdf>
21. Iyob, R. (2008). Comparative perspectives: Territorial and boundary disputes in the Horn of Africa. In M. Issaka & K. Y. Ngandu (Rapporteurs), *Pacific settlement of border disputes: Lessons from the Bakassi affair and the Greentree Agreement* (pp. 28–34). International Peace Institute.
<https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/bakassipub.pdf>
22. Kamto, M. (2008). The Bakassi affair: Cameroon's challenge for peace. In M. Issaka & K. Y. Ngandu (Rapporteurs), *Pacific settlement of border disputes: Lessons from the Bakassi affair and the Greentree Agreement* (pp. 13–19). International Peace Institute.
<https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/bakassipub.pdf>
23. Ngalim, A. N. (2019). Post-conflict experiences of resettled Bakassi Peninsula people, 2006–2016. *Asian Journal of Peacebuilding*, 7(1), 105–123. <https://doi.org/10.18588/201905.00a060>
24. Ogwu, J. (2008). Bakassi, conflict prevention, and the path to peace. In M. Issaka & K. Y. Ngandu (Rapporteurs), *Pacific settlement of border disputes: Lessons from the Bakassi affair and the Greentree Agreement* (pp. 11–12). International Peace Institute.
<https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/bakassipub.pdf>
25. Presidency of the Republic of Cameroon. (2013). Cameroon assumes full sovereignty over Bakassi. <https://www.prc.cm/en/news/336-cameroon-assumes-full-sovereignty-over-bakassi>
26. Seymour, L. J. M. (2013). Sovereignty, territory and authority: Boundary maintenance in contemporary Africa. *Critical African Studies*, 5(1), 17–31. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21681392.2013.774791>
27. United Nations News. (2013a, August 15). Security Council praises Cameroon, Nigeria for Bakassi Peninsula transition.
<https://news.un.org/en/story/2013/08/446862-security-council-praises-cameroon-nigeria-bakassi-peninsula-transition>
28. United Nations News. (2013b, October). Bakassi transfer good example of preventive diplomacy, says UN envoy for West Africa. <https://news.un.org/en/story/2013/10/453642>
29. United Nations Office for West Africa. (n.d.). Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission.
<https://unowa.unmissions.org/cameroon-nigeria-mixed-commission-0>
30. United Nations Security Council. (2013, August 15). Security Council press statement on Bakassi Peninsula developments (SC/11094, AFR/2680). <https://press.un.org/en/2013/sc11094.doc.htm>
31. United Nations. (2006, June 12). Nigeria, Cameroon sign agreement ending decades-old border dispute; sets procedures for Nigerian withdrawal from Bakassi Peninsula [Press release]. United Nations Information Service, Vienna. <https://unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/pressrels/2006/afr1397.html>
32. United Nations. (2008, August 14). Secretary-General's message on the occasion of the ceremony for the withdrawal and transfer of authority in the Bakassi Peninsula [Statement delivered by K. Prendergast, Calabar]. <https://www.un.org/sg/en/node/192185>



© 2026 by the authors. Submitted for possible open access publication under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/>).